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Summary: This ARI provides an overview of the EU’s capability for the planning, 
command and control of CSDP military operations and offers some practical 
recommendations. It argues that the lack of a permanent operational planning capability 
hampers flexibility in the Union’s planning process, as politico-strategic deliberations over 
potential CSDP missions lack the crucial operational expertise necessary to address 
crucial political questions, such as how many troops are needed and for how long or how 
much the mission will cost. Secondly, the lack of an operational planning capability denies 
the Union the capacity to develop (advance) contingency planning products, that are so 
crucial in situations where rapid reaction is required. Finally, the lack of a permanent 
command and control infrastructure has a negative impact upon the quality and security of 
the Union’s military Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and hampers the kind 
of overall situational awareness offered by a central command, so vital for a Union that 
aims to think more strategically (as argued in the 2008 revision of the European Security 
Strategy). 
 
 
 
Analysis: In the context of its broader effort to improve European military capabilities, the 
Spanish EU Presidency has suggested the designation of the existing Operations Centre 
in Brussels as the ‘preferred OHQ’ for BattleGroup operations. This ARI1 welcomes the 
forward-looking spirit behind that proposal and offers additional practical 
recommendations that would substantially improve it, namely an increase of some 50 
officials in the Operations Centre’s permanent personnel. Such an increase would help to 
solve existing deficiencies in the areas of advance planning, planning flexibility and 
command and control. 
 
                                                 
* Thomas Holloway Scholar at Royal Holloway College, University of London, Fellow of the 
European Foreign and Security Policy Studies programme of the Compagnia di San Paolo-
Volkswagen Stiftung-Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and currently completing a PhD on European 
Security at the Royal Holloway. 
1 This ARI builds on the argument developed in Luis Simon, ‘Command and Control? Planning for EU Military 
Operations’, EU ISS Occasional Paper nr 81. 
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The first part of this ARI describes the process for the planning, command and control of 
CSDP military operations. In the second part it argues that the nature of the EU’s planning 
and C2 capability responds to the existing political balance between the Union’s Big 
Three, with France supporting the development of a permanent and autonomous 
Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and the UK and Germany resisting any potential 
duplication of structures already existing at NATO. The third and last part offers some 
practical recommendations to the Spanish Presidency. 
 
The Union’s Military Planning, Command and Control Capability 
According to the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level, 
‘Military Planning is an iterative process which needs to analyse all relevant factors to 
determine the military mission. At the political and strategic level this will include analysis 
of the implication of political objectives, desired end state, restraints and constraints as 
well as an analysis of the capabilities needed, in order to develop potential military options 
balanced against those capabilities that are offered or potentially available’. 
 
Military Planning is conducted at four levels: 
 
(1) The Political and Strategic Level (EU institutional level). 
(2) The Military Strategic Level (Operation Headquarters –OHQ– level). 
(3) The Operational Level (Force Headquarters –FHQ– level). 
(4) The Tactical Level (Component Headquarters level and below).2 
 
It is important to distinguish Advance Planning from Crisis Response Planning. Advance 
Planning is conducted to allow the EU to deal with potential crises. It is sub-divided into 
two categories: 
 
(1) Generic Planning is the production of basic planning documents for potential 
operations where some planning factors have not yet been fully identified or 
have not been assumed. It identifies the general capabilities required. 
(2) Contingency Planning is the production of detailed planning documents for 
potential operations where the planning factors have been identified or have 
been assumed. They include an indication of resources needed and the 
deployment options. They may form the basis for subsequent planning. 
 
Crisis Response Planning is conducted to enable the EU to deal with real crises. It builds 
on Advance Planning products, whenever available.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 ‘European Union Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level’, Council Doc 10687/08, 
Brussels, 16/VI/2008. 
3 Ibid. 
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Figure 1. The CSDP Planning Cycle 
 
Source: European Union Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level, Council doc. 10687/08. 
 
The first element of the Union’s Crisis Response Planning process relates to the 
identification of the crisis, which falls to the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN), placed within 
the General Council Secretariat.  
 
Once the Council has agreed to prepare a military response to a given crisis, the 
Secretary General/High Representative can send an information gathering or fact-finding 
mission integrated by military and civilian experts. This exploration phase is followed by 
the definition of the political, strategic and political-military objectives of the operation, the 
end state and exit strategy, the constraints and limitations, risks, timeline considerations, 
tasks and chain of command, through the so-called Crisis Management Concept (CMC). 
The CMC offers the basis for the Joint Action that will provide the legal framework for the 
operation. DGE 8 at the General Council Secretariat is responsible for crafting the CMC 
for ESDP military operations. 
 
Building on the CMC, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) will produce the Military Strategic 
Options (MSOs), which describe ‘a military action designed to achieve the EU objectives 
as defined in the CMC. A MSO will outline the military course of action and the required 
resources and the constraints’.4 Once the MSOs have been produced, the EUMC 
prioritises them and the PSC decides on the preferred course of action. 
 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
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Once a MSO has been chosen, the EUMS produces the Initiating Military Directive (IMD), 
which ‘should provide a clear description of the EU political/military objectives and the 
envisaged military mission to achieve these objectives’.5 The IMD defines the military 
strategic level of command; once it is issued, the Operation Commander (OpCdr) and the 
Operational Headquarters (OHQ) kick into the planning process. This provides the OpCdr 
with political advice that should be taken into account when producing the Concept of 
Operation (CONOPS), the Provisional Statement of Requirements (PSOR), the Operation 
Plan (OPLAN), the Rules of Engagement Request (ROEREQ) and the achievement of the 
End State and Exit Strategy.6 
 
The IMD is the core of a broader transition package that the EUMS sends to the OHQ, 
including personnel. Through the IMD and the emissaries it sends to the OHQ, the EUMS 
provides input into the OPLAN. However, it is the military strategic level of command or 
OHQ and, more specifically, the OpCdr that is responsible for the development of a 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN). Under the authority 
of the OpCdr, the OHQ also exerts command and control over the operation, to actually 
ensure that its development matches the OPLAN. Only an OHQ can, given its specific 
expertise, engage in operational planning. The Union does not have a permanent military 
strategic level of command or OHQ. Instead, it disposes of three different ways of 
acquiring that capability in an ad-hoc manner, the first one relying on NATO and the other 
two ‘autonomously’: 
 
• The Berlin Plus agreements offer the EU the presumption of availability of NATO’s 
assets and capabilities for ESDP operations, most notably in the realm of planning 
and C2. Final confirmation of the lease of such assets and capabilities lies with the 
North Atlantic Council, which decides on a case-by-case basis. 
• Through the framework nation system the UK (Northwood), France (Mont 
Valérien), Germany (Potsdam), Greece (Larissa) and Italy (Rome), offer their 
national OHQs for CSDP military operations. The framework nation must ensure 
that it is equipped to accommodate augmentees from other EU Member States. 
• An Operations Centre, placed within the Civ/Mil cell of the EUMS in Brussels can 
be activated for the planning and C2 of a CSDP military operations ‘should the 
Council decide so’. 
 
In order to understand the nature and evolution of the Union’s planning and C2 capability 
one needs to look at the politics of planning and conduct. Most particularly, the 
preferences and behaviour of France, the UK and Germany (the Union’s Big Three) are 
largely accountable for the slow pace of the evolution of the Union’s Planning and conduct 
capability. 
 
The Planning and C2 Game: It Takes Three to Tango 
France is the main advocate of a permanent, autonomous and fully-fledged operational 
headquarters. For the French there is a causal correlation between European strategic 
autonomy, a concept to which they are deeply attached, and the existence of a permanent 
OHQ that offers appropriate operational input to the strategic planning process, is able to 
do advance contingency planning and serves as the central reference for a permanent 
and autonomous command and control infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid, p. 9. 
6 Ibid. 
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The UK plays the role of a status quo power in the planning and C2 debate, and leads the 
resistance against France’s push for a fully-fledged and autonomous OHQ. London still 
sees ESDP largely as a means of strengthening NATO and the transatlantic relationship 
and wants to avoid duplication within the wider pool of transatlantic capabilities. It is in this 
context that it strongly resists the creation of a multinational planning and C2 capability 
which already exists at NATO. Britain sees ESDP as an extra lever for stimulating the 
strengthening of European military capabilities but, unlike France, sees no causal 
correlation between European military capabilities and EU strategic autonomy. The UK is 
most interested in those areas in which ESDP can add value to the wider transatlantic 
pool, namely the civilian realm. 
 
Although perhaps less vocal than the French or the British, Germany’s position is crucial 
for understanding the nature of the Union’s planning and conduct capability. Germany’s 
key objective is to ‘CFSPise’ ESDP, not least due to the difficulties it faces in reforming its 
armed forces in a climate where the German public is reluctant to see the Bundeswehr 
deployed overseas. In this respect, Berlin tries to emphasise the importance of non-
military solutions (an area in which it excels) to security problems and upload to Brussels 
the notion of civilian power, much championed in Berlin. Germany sees the ‘civ/milisation’ 
of the Union’s planning and C2 capability as the way forward, insofar as its understanding 
of the comprehensive approach sees the military instrument as virtually superfluous for 
purposes other than territorial defence. Furthermore, Germany does not want to upset the 
transatlantic framework under which European and German stability have prospered. 
 
The ‘awkward alignment’ between the UK and Germany is particularly responsible for the 
rather modest evolution of the Union’s planning and C2 capability. Although using 
different means (opposition by the former, ambiguity and inaction by the latter) and driven 
by different motives (‘Atlanticism’ in the case of the former, ‘Civilian Power Europe’ in the 
case of the latter), the behaviour of these two countries has been key in confounding the 
creation of the permanent military strategic level of command Paris has pursued so 
eagerly. Albeit for different reasons, both London and Berlin champion the notion of 
Civ/Mil integration at the military strategic level (the so-called Civ-Mil OHQ). Whereas 
London perceives the idea of a civ/mil OHQ as a means of drowning the Union’s strategic 
potential in civilian waters, Berlin supports the notion of Civ/Mil integration at the military-
strategic level out of strategic cultural conviction. 
 
How has the Union’s military planning and C2 capability evolved? 
 
As the institutional setting of ESDP was being discussed in the interval between the June 
1999 Cologne EU Council and the December 2000 Nice one, discussions on the nature of 
the EUMS constituted the first debate on the nature of the Union’s planning and C2 
capability. According to an insider to the discussions, ‘there was an absolute consensus 
that something like the EUMS was needed to assist the political institutions with strategic 
planning’.7 It was, however, the very nature of that something that sparked the argument. 
Paris wanted a fully-fledged OHQ capable of doing advance planning and with a 
permanent C2 structure, as it considered it inseparable from the autonomous European 
crisis management capability to which the 1999 Cologne EU Council had committed. 
London, for its part, was more in favour of a small international secretariat that would 
assist the EUMS with strategic planning but would have no operational punch, in order to 
avoid the duplication of a capability already existing at NATO. The Germans stood close 
                                                 
7 Author’s interview with EUMC representative in Brussels, May 2008. 
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to the British position: they wanted to avoid duplication with NATO and supported the 
British vision of a political structure with some military expertise rather than the French 
vision of an operational structure.8 A compromise was reached along the lines of the 
British-German position. The EUMS would stay away from the business of advance 
planning, restricting its activities to the realms of early warning, situation assessment and 
assisting with the politico-strategic phase of crisis response planning. It would have no 
capacity for operational planning or C2. 
 
As a way of compensating for the lack of an operational planning and C2 capability, the 
framework nation and Berlin Plus tracks were agreed under the provisions of the Helsinki 
Force Catalogue. For the French, the framework nation scheme was a transitional 
solution only justified by the need to maintain the capacity to act of the European military 
instrument. The UK, on its part, was most instrumental in bringing about the so-called 
Berlin Plus agreements through which the Union would gain access to the Alliance’s 
planning and conduct capability at SHAPE. 
 
The first attempt to restructure the Union’s planning and C2 capability was aimed at 
mainstreaming the objectives contained in the 2010 Headline Goal (notably the need for 
rapid reaction and greater Civ/Mil interaction) into the Union’s planning and conduct 
capability. In this context, the Council decided to create a Civ/Mil cell within the EU 
Military Staff that would ‘reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU 
autonomous operation, assist in coordinating civilian operations and have the 
responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous operation, once 
a decision on such operation had been taken’.9 Attached to it would be the new 
Operations Centre, a sort of embryo of an OHQ that could be activated at the request of 
the Council on a case-by-case basis. 
 
This first planning and C2 reshuffle is an eloquent example of the extent to which politics 
delimit the scope of evolution in the Union’s planning and C2 capability. The need to 
downplay the strong sense of intra-European bitterness caused by Iraq underpinned a 
mood for movement on the planning and C2 front. Most interestingly perhaps, Germany’s 
oscillation towards the French position at the April 2003 Tervuren Summit was 
instrumental in advocating for the need to reform the Union’s planning and C2 capability. 
Months later, a tripartite compromise between France, the UK and Germany in December 
2003 in Berlin gave way to the Civ/Mil cell-Ops Centre package. In the words of a French 
official: 
 
‘we convinced the German Chancellor on the necessity of a Permanent Joint 
OHQ, but we did not convince the German military. For the British that was a red 
line. We had a very long trilateral discussion, and the result was a bad 
compromise’.10 
 
Concerns over the planning delays in the 2006 EUFOR operation in DRC acted as the 
trigger to the post-Wiesbaden process in mid-2007, which resulted in a second 
reorganisation of the Union’s planning and C2 capability. A brand new division fully 
devoted to advance planning, the Military Assessment on Planning (MAP) branch, was 
created within the EUMS. The German EU Presidency agreed with the French that the 
EUFOR DRC operation had called into question the efficiency of the Union’s planning and 
                                                 
8 Author’s interview with EUMC representative in Brussels, May 2008. 
9 ‘European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations’, op. cit. in note 12, p. 3. 
10 Author’s interview at the French Ministry of Defence in Paris, June 2009. 
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C2 capability. For the French the lessons to be learned from the DRC mission was that 
the EU needed a permanent operational planning capability that would help avoid the kind 
of delays in the politico-strategic planning process experienced in the run up to the Congo 
mission. However, the German Presidency agreed with the British that the lessons from 
DRC should concentrate in improving the Union’s strategic planning structures, not the 
operational ones. Even if modest, the post-Wiesbaden process resulted in an 
improvement in the Union’s PC2 capability: with the creation of the MAP, the path towards 
a European advance planning capability was, in principle, open. 
 
In late 2008, NATO-friendly France’s hold of the EU Presidency and US support for an 
autonomous CSDP raised expectations over a more fundamental reshuffle of the Union’s 
planning and C2 capability, and potentially the creation of a fully-fledged OHQ. While the 
financial crunch, the Georgian crisis and the Irish ‘No’ vote in the first referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty in June 2008 certainly drained the energies of the French EU Presidency, 
Britain’s ongoing uneasiness towards the concept of a permanent OHQ remained the 
biggest obstacle to France’s ESDP agenda. Towards the end of the French Presidency, in 
November 2008, a proposal was put forward for the creation of a Crisis Management and 
Planning Directorate (CMPD). Although many of the details concerning its organisation 
still remain unclear, the new CMPD will gather into a single body all the strategic planning 
capabilities until now spread out across the Council’s structure (DGE 8, DGE 9 and parts 
of the Civ/Mil cell). The CMPD will offer comprehensive strategic planning, including 
advance planning, and will have responsibility for the Crisis Management Concept. It will 
have ‘a military angle, a police angle, a rule-of-law angle, a development angle, etc’.11 A 
Detached Augmentee Cadre (DAC) integrated within the CMPD will be deployed into the 
Union’s various Operational Headquarters, both military (framework nation, SHAPE, 
OpsCentre) and civilian (CPCC). 
 
The question of the nature of the Union’s capability for the planning and C2 of ESDP 
military operations has, arguably, been the issue surrounded by the most controversy 
throughout the ESDP process. It has been in the context of this debate that the Union’s 
most influential Member States have most vigorously projected their views over the heart 
and soul of ESDP, namely its degree of autonomy from NATO and the appropriate 
balance between the civilian and the military instrument. The awkward alignment between 
the UK and Germany largely explains the rather modest development of the Union’s 
planning and C2 capability and, most particularly, the lack of a permanent military 
strategic level of command or OHQ. On three occasions (in late 2003, mid-2007 and late 
2008) the French have explored windows of opportunity to bump up the Union’s planning 
and C2 capability. On the same three occasions they have met with Britain’s explicit 
opposition and Germany’s ‘destructive ambiguity’. Compromises between the Big Three 
have led to some improvement in the Union’s planning and C2 capability. Yet the fact of 
the matter remains that the lack of a permanent military-strategic level of command 
continues to considerably cripple the performance of the Union’s planning and C2 
capability. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Author’s interview with General Council Secretariat official in Brussels, May 2009. 
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Conclusions: The Union’s planning and C2 system is severely handicapped, as the 
current ad-hoc system (framework nation, Berlin Plus, Ops Centre) does not meet 
minimum quality standards. Most notable are the lack of an advance planning capability, 
the lack of operational input into the politico-strategic process and the lack of a permanent 
command and CIS infrastructure. In the words of an official from the General Council 
Secretariat: 
 
‘When you plan something from Brussels at the strategic level, fundamentally 
there are three things that Member States would really like to know: how many 
troops, how much money and how long? We are in no position to answer any of 
those three questions satisfactorily. In order to do that you need an OHQ that is 
theatre-acquainted. Since we don’t have it, we try and plan things from a strategic 
level, but it is very unprofessional and unreliable’.12 
 
The current institutional design underpinning the Union’s planning process tends to 
accentuate what is essentially an artificial division between what are commonly referred to 
as the politico-strategic and operational phases of planning. Both in the national and 
NATO contexts, the various levels of command can go up and down the planning and C2 
ladder as the situation requires. Planning and conduct are inherently porous activities. On 
the one hand, operational input is tantamount to an informed politico-strategic process. 
On the other, OHQ-OpCdr involvement in politico-strategic deliberations ensures a 
greater feeling of ownership at the military-strategic level, a feeling that results in greater 
political awareness throughout the operational level. 
 
Beyond this more general problem of a lack of flexibility throughout the planning and C2 
cycle, the lack of a permanent military strategic level of command creates CIS and 
situational awareness issues. According to an EUMS official, ‘the lack of a permanent CIS 
is the biggest problem we face in the realm of C2: our current CIS does not meet the 
security requirements of the military.13 Furthermore, a permanent OHQ would make it 
possible to better keep track of all European deployments, enhancing the Union’s broader 
situational awareness’. 
 
In this regard, the Spanish Presidency’s suggestion to designate the Operations Centre 
as the preferred OHQ for BattleGroup Operations14 is a very promising initiative provided 
the ‘preferred OHQ’ designation is accompanied by an increase of the personnel and 
resources of the Permanent Nucleus of the Ops Centre. With the CIS infrastructure that 
the Ops Centre already has, a planning and C2 skeleton of some 50 personnel would 
suffice to address the Union’s shortages in the realm of advance contingency planning 
and for the purposes of increasing flexibility in the planning process. It is also of the 
utmost importance that the OpsCentre maintains the principle of military autonomy: while 
a comprehensive approach to crisis management requires that the concept of Civ/Mil 
integration is applied at the politico-strategic level (ie, the new Crisis Management 
Planning Directorate), at the military-strategic level of command, Civ/Mil cooperation must 
be addressed through coordination (by co-location) and not integration. This Spanish 
proposal, provided it is accompanied with the necessary boost in the OpsCentre’s 
permanent staff, would sort out several aspects at once: it would improve the prospects 
for using the BattleGroups (theoretically available since 2007 and not yet used) and would 
                                                 
12 Author’s interview with General Council Secretariat official in Brussels, May 2009. 
13 Author’s interview with EUMS official in Brussels, May 2009. 
14 Intervention of Spanish Minister of Defence Carme Chacon before the Spanish Senate on the priorities of 
the Spanish EU Presidency on CSDP, available at http://www.mde.es/actualidad/intervencion/. 
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save many of the headaches associated with force generation; it would give the Union the 
necessary advance planning capacity and planning flexibility that rapid reaction require; 
and it would bring important benefits in terms of situational awareness and CIS security, 
boosting the efficiency of the Union’s command and control capability. This is an 
opportunity for Spain to prove its pro-European credentials in a meaningful area. 
 
Luis Simon 
Thomas Holloway Scholar at Royal Holloway College, University of London, Fellow of the 
European Foreign and Security Policy Studies programme of the Compagnia di San 
Paolo-Volkswagen Stiftung-Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and currently completing a PhD 
on European Security at the Royal Holloway 
 
Abbreviations 
BG BattleGroup 
BIH Bosnia Herzegovina 
C2 Command and Control 
CAR Central African Republic 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIS Communication and Information Systems 
CMC Crisis Management Concept 
CMPD Crisis Management Planning Directorate 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
DGE Directorate General 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
ESS European Security Strategy 
EUMC EU Military Committee 
EUMS EU Military Staff 
EUSG EU Staff Group 
FHQ Force Headquarters 
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
HG Headline Goal 
IFOR Implementation Force 
IMD Initiating Military Directive 
MAP Military Assessment on Planning 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MSO Military Strategic Option 
MSOD Military Strategic Options Directive 
OHQ Operational Headquarters 
OpCdr Operations Commander 
OPLAN Operation Plan 
Ops Operations 
PSC Political and Security Committee 
RCA République Centrafricaine 
SFOR Stabilisation Force 
SG Secretary General 
SG/HR Secretary General/High Representative 
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
SITCEN Situation Centre 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
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